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BOOK REVIEWS
By H.R. Haldeman with Joseph DiMona.1 New
York: The New York Times Book Co., Inc., 1978. Pp. xxi, 326.
$12.95.
2
Reviewed by George L. Waas

THE ENDS OF POWER.

It would be easy at first blush to cast aside The Ends of Power as
simply another Watergate book written for profit-an attempt by
its author to reap financial reward from criminal activity-except
that the author served for more than four years as Richard Nixon's
Chief of Staff, the President's alter ego, "the second most powerful
man in government." 3
An explanation of Watergate from this unique vantage point is
the book's overriding justification as Haldeman meshes theory with
revelation in presenting his version of how a "third-rate burglary" 4
became a convoluted labyrinthine cancer which consumed an administration, toppled a President, crippled a nation's faith in its
government, and almost tore apart its constitution.
There is no mistaking the fact that this book is about Watergate.
Although Haldeman highlights some of Nixon's accomplishments in
foreign affairs and intimates that his ex-boss averted a crisis with
the Soviet Union in 1970 similar to Kennedy's 1962 confrontation
with Russia over the installation of missiles in Cuba, the author
continually returns to the burglary and the cover-up.
According to Haldeman, Watergate happened because of an unbelievable failure of President Nixon and his men to grasp the significance of each event as it occurred in relation to previous events.
They could not fit the pieces into the Watergate puzzle as each piece
came into existence until it was too late and others had seen the
whole sordid picture.
Haldeman's Watergate catharsis is a study of roleplaying by ambitious men and extremism in the practice and pursuit of Presiden1.

H.R. Haldeman is the former Chief of Staff to President Richard M. Nixon. Joseph
LAST MAN AT ARLINGTON and THE BENEDICT ARNOLD

DiMona is an author whose books include
CONNECTION.

2. Member, The Florida Bar. B.S.J., University of Florida, 1965; J.D., Florida State
University, 1970.
3. As so stated by members of the Washington press corps and others in and out of the
Nixon administration.
4. The White House's initial public reaction to Watergate as stated by Press Secretary
Ronald Ziegler.
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tial loyalty coupled with the absolute belief that the end justifies the
means.
The author begins his Watergate reflections by looking at the
central figure, his ex-boss, Richard Nixon. Haldeman portrays his
mentor as a study of stark contrasts-brilliant and sociable, secretive and vindictive. Throughout the book, the author refers to examples of Nixon's explosive dark side, particularly his welldocumented vendetta against the press and against all those he
perceived as political enemies.
Nixon's attack mentality pervaded his inner White House structure and permeated the attitudes of his closest advisors. The President's attitude and its ability to infect those close to him meshed
with Nixon's envy of the Kennedy style and charisma and with his
own shortcomings (which Haldeman characterizes as "amazing
awkwardness") to nurture effectively the seeds which sprouted into
Watergate.
Against this backdrop, Nixon employed Haldeman as "the
straight, hit-them-over-the-head" [p. 61] tactician, domestic advisor John Ehrlichman "was given the more devious approach"
[id.], and Charles Colson "was assigned the real underground
routes" [id.]. Such was the inner structure of the Office of the
President of the United States in the early 1970's!
Haldeman says Nixon's personality and paranoia led him to erect
a wall of isolation-a "Berlin wall"-around the President. The
author cites two reasons for insulating Nixon and cultivating criticism for Presidential inaccessibility: to avoid wasting precious Presidential time and to protect Nixon from himself. Nixon was prone
to issue vindictive orders (such as, in an emotional outburst, an
edict barring the press from Air Force One) which, for obvious reasons, were never to be carried out. It was Haldeman's job to screen
these orders and separate those which were to be executed from
those which had to be ignored.
With all these elements in place, Haldeman spins his tale as to
why the Watergate break-in occurred. According to the author,
Nixon believed that Democratic National Committee Chairman
Larry O'Brien was on Howard Hughes's payroll as a lobbyist and
told Colson, the President's "hit man," to "get the goods" on
O'Brien. Colson then passed the word to E. Howard Hunt, who
conferred with G. Gordon Liddy, who decided that placing a tap on
O'Brien's phone (and that of a Hughes associate) would be the
starting point. Haldeman believes that the Democratic high command knew of the planned break-in, let it happen, and may even
have planted the plainclothesmen who arrested the burglars. He
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also believes that the CIA monitored the burglary, which he claims
was deliberately sabotaged.
The author also theorizes that the incessant probing into the Watergate burglary in an effort to find a White House connection
stemmed from Nixon's announced massive reorganization of the
government in 1973 and its threat to the four major power blocs in
Washington (in order of importance): the press, the bureaucracy,
the Congress, and the intelligence community.
Each of them was under threat by the President in January 1973,
who was at the height of his popularity with the American people.
Each of them reacted with special ferocity because that President
was Richard Nixon. And in the months of January, February and
March of 1973, they would mount a war on the White House. [P.
181.]
Then came the tapes. Haldeman believes that Alex Butterfield,
a former CIA agent who revealed the existence of the Nixon tapes
during his appearance before the Senate Watergate Committee,
may have been a CIA plant in the White House and that he may
have been one of several such infiltrators. This is but another manifestation of the White House siege mentality at the time.
As Nixon became more and more aware of what was on those
tapes, Haldeman believes his ex-boss's involvement increased proportionately. The author maintains that Nixon participated in the
cover-up for three reasons: first, to prevent any possible connection
of himself to the break-in through Colson; second, to forestall disclosure of former Attorney General John Mitchell's involvement; and
third, to avoid exposure of other things such as the break-in of Dr.
Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office. Nixon's involvement became
so pitched that, according to Haldeman, the President personally
sought to erase all Watergate material from the tapes when he
started to worry that they-and he-might be exposed.
Yet Haldeman maintains that Nixon would have survived in the
White House were it not for some bad luck:
Ittook bombshell after bombshell. . . to destroy a powerful President. What is fascinating in reconstructing the true story of Watergate is both the timing of those bombshells and the surprise twists
which made their shocks even more effective. Nixon was never
prepared. Time and again after he thought he had stabilized his
ship of state, and knew every danger lurking in the waters, another
torpedo would explode amidships and Nixon and his crew, including me, would frantically be shoring up bulkheads against a sea of
outrage. [P. 232.]
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Haldeman recites the three most significant events leading to
Nixon's resignation: the disclosure of the tapes, John Dean's transition from White House loyalist to leading informer, and the United
States Supreme Court's ruling against Nixon on disclosure of the
tapes to the special Watergate prosecutors. On the last point,
Haldeman makes his most damning accusation against his former
boss by saying that Nixon would have defied the Supreme Court
and refused to turn over the tapes if a less than unanimous decision
had been rendered. When the Court, on July 18, 1974, ruled eight
to zero against Nixon, it unknowingly averted a constitutional showdown between the executive and judicial branches of government.
It is unfortunate that Haldeman believes it is necessary to spend
so much time trying to find psychological and political reasons to
explain Watergate as justification for his premise that it was blown
completely out of proportion by those out to "get" Nixon. Such an
excuse for what happened is of secondary value. What this book
lacks is a moral judgment and a statement to the reader that this
type of conduct from those privileged to serve at the ultimate level
of power must never be tolerated. Although he admits limited culpability, the author seeks to excuse his crime by saying that his
perjury conviction arose out of events that appeared inconsequential
and innocent at the time. Moreover, Haldeman intimates that, had
the tapes been destroyed and had Dean remained silent, Nixon
would have completed his second term.
The Ends of Power tells the reader much about the personality
and psychological constitution of Richard Nixon. It also tells us
much about his militant alter ego, who says he did not understand
or come to grips with the significance of Watergate in time to save
his chief and himself and, just prior to Nixon's resignation, asked
his beleaguered former boss for a pardon for all Watergate participants, throwing in for good measure a pardon for Vietnam draft
resisters. Haldeman's last request of President Nixon was a thinly
veiled effort by this martinet to avoid prison for perjury and incidentally to get others off the hook.
A proper and adequate review of this book must take into account
the author's spoken intentions and unspoken motives. Because,
although Haldeman professes ignorance of the true and profound
impact of Watergate as each event unfolded, he stands before the
people as a convicted perjurer trying to explain away this sordid
chapter in American history and blame others for its fallout while
reaping economic rewards for telling his side of the story. In sum, it
is impossible to judge this book by its cover.

THE GOOD Guys, THE BAD GuYS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREE
SPEECH VS. FAIRNESS IN BROADCASTING. By Fred W. Friendly,' New
York: Random House, 1976. Pp. xvi, 236. $10.00.
Reviewed by Neil D.McFeeley

"[In] some areas of the law it is easy to tell the good guys from
the bad guys. . . . In the current debate over the broadcast media
and the First Amendment . . . each debator claims to be the real
protector of the First Amendment . . . . [T]he answers are not

easy" [p. xi]. This quote from Judge J. Skelly Wright indicates the
issue which Fred Friendly confronts in this book. By focusing on the
evolution of the "fairness doctrine" as applied to electronic journalism, Friendly attempts to take a wide look at the question of the
application of first amendment freedom of the press to television
and radio.
Friendly, who served as president of CBS News and is now a
journalism professor at Columbia University, is in an excellent position to discuss the controversy between freedom of the press and
fairness. (The only time Friendly's personal bias in favor of TV
news, and CBS in particular, seems to show is in a relatively unimportant chapter in which he castigates a defective study highly critical of the Walter Cronkite show.) This perspective enables him to
explore thoroughly the problem of how to prevent governmental
interference with broadcast journalism, yet ensure access for opposing points of view. This is the conflict that the networks, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), the Congress, and the courts
have tried to resolve since the government began to allocate the
airways and to license stations.
Friendly traces the development of the fairness doctrine-the
FCC regulation (later codified in law) which requires that a
"reasonable amount" of broadcast time be devoted to discussion of
controversial issues and that a "reasonable opportunity" to present
opposing viewpoints be provided. He notes that the latter aspect has
been the subject of much of the controversy-the question of the
"personal attack" provision upheld in Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC;3 the use of the fairness doctrine as an instrument of public
1. Fred W. Friendly is Edward R. Murrow Professor of Journalism at the Columbia School
of Journalism and is the Ford Foundation Advisor on Communications. He is a former
president of CBS News. Mr. Friendly received his Lh.D. from Rhode Island College in 1965,
and was awarded a Doctor of Honorary Letters degree by Grinnell College in 1967.
2. Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Idaho. B.A., University of Texas
at Austin, 1971; Ph.D., University of Texas at Austin, 1975.
3. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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policy in anticigarette advertising; and the question of equal access
by the opposition to combat the President's use of TV. In all these
areas there is a balancing of the rights of those who demand fairness
on the part of radio and television stations and the rights of those
journalists and others who argue that the government has no right
to (and is prohibited by the first amendment from attempting to)
regulate any part of the news media. Friendly describes how the
various agencies and courts have attempted this balance.
One of the better parts of the book is Friendly's close examination
of a few specific cases. Red Lion, the 1969 case in which the fairness
doctrine was upheld, is traced from its beginning to the eventual
Supreme Court decision. Friendly offers a fascinating account of a
significant case which began with a demand for free rebuttal time
worth less than ten dollars on a local radio station and yet resulted
in a quarter of a million dollars worth of legal costs, the interplay
of national political parties, and a judgment day in the Supreme
Court. Friendly discusses both the interesting background and the
strategy of the case which led to a "race to the circuits" in order to
get the most favorable hearing.
Friendly goes beyond this discussion of individual cases to an
examination of the central issue of freedom of the press versus fairness. He explores the opinions of a variety of network executives,
journalists, FCC Commissioners, Congressmen, and judges in at
attempt to show the conflicts in their views. He examines the Supreme Court's decision in Miami Herald PublishingCo. v. Tornillo4
(rejecting the notion of government-required fairness in newspapers) and compares this more recent decision to that in Red Lion.
Tornillo, which some claim relegates the electronic media to
second-class status, is explained not by the theoretical fact of
scarcity of licenses but by the fact that it is the government which
grants the electronic media the exclusive place on the dial through
the licensing process. But does this process confer on government
the right to regulate the content of broadcast news?
The final chapters in The Good Guys, the Bad Guys and the First
Amendment attempt to answer this question. Friendly offers his
own thoughts on the issue and argues that there should be a middle
ground between those who decry any governmental regulation and
those who would have the FCC monitor each newscast for evidence
of bias. He suggests that this middle ground might be a voluntary
policy by the electronic media of access for responsible opposing
viewpoints. Stations would then be judged on their overall records
4.

418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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of compliance "with the goal of devoting prime time to the discussion of controversial issues of public importance, and [their] active
policy of affording reasonable opportunity for opposing viewpoints"
[p. 226]. This approach would also require Congress to chart a
course between the extremes of repeal of the fairness doctrine and
rigid enforcement of it, a course which would not be easy but perhaps "is the only sane alternative" [p. 222].
Friendly's proposal is indeed a valid one-"the kind of freespeech formula," according to Friendly, "that can keep the FCC out
of the newsroom and the broadcasters out of the courtroom" [p.
226]. But this formulation is perhaps too sanguine, for will it solve
the problem completely? Who if not the FCC will enforce the
"voluntary" access? Why will not politics intrude in the licensing
process as Friendly reports it has before? Will not the courts have
to balance the competing interests as they have previously?
Friendly does not answer these questions, but his suggestion is at
least an attempt to solve this important issue. That attempt is
valuable in itself. And since it focuses attention on the requirement
for discussion of controversial issues, it is also important.
The Good Guys, the Bad Guys and the First Amendment is an
entertaining book. Friendly writes well and is a thorough researcher.
His accounts of the cases are informative, and his discussion of the
strategies of litigation and political dealing is eye-opening.
Friendly's book is a valuable discussion of a significant legal and
political issue. He does not identify who the good guys are and who
the bad guys are, but he does explain the controversy and propose
a credible solution. For those concerned with the balance between
first amendment freedoms and public fairness in electronic journalism, this book is essential and worthwhile reading.

